Recursive Construction of a Nash Equilibrium in a Two-Player Nonzero-Sum Stopping Game with Asymmetric Information

Nash equilibria of threshold type for two-player nonzero-sum games of stopping

This paper analyses two-player nonzero-sum games of optimal stopping on a class of regular diffusions with singular boundary behaviour (in the sense of Itô and McKean (1974) [19], p. 108). We prove that Nash equilibria are realised by stopping the diffusion at the first exit time from suitable intervals whose boundaries solve a system of algebraic equations. Under mild additional assumptions we...

Distribution Design of Two Rival Decenteralized Supply Chains: a Two-person Nonzero Sum Game Theory Approach

We consider competition between two decentralized supply chains network under demand uncertainty. Each chain consists of one risk-averse manufacturer and a group of risk-averse retailers. These two chains present substitutable products to the geographical dispensed markets. The markets’ demands are contingent upon prices, service levels, and advertising efforts of two supply chains. We formulat...

Nash Equilibrium in Nonzero-Sum Games of Optimal Stopping for Brownian Motion

Asymptotic ε-Nash Equilibrium for 2 Order Two-Player Nonzero-sum Singular LQ Games with Decentralized Control

We propose a new equilibrium concept: asymptotic ε-Nash equilibrium for 2 order two-player nonzero-sum games where each player has a control-free cost functional quadratic in the system states over an infinite horizon and each player’s control strategy is constrained to be continuous linear state feedback. Based on each player’s singular control problem, the asymptotic ε-Nash equilibrium implem...

Two-player Nonzero-sum !-regular Games

We study in nite stochastic games played by two-players on a nite graph with goals speci ed by sets of in nite traces. The games are concurrent (each player simultaneously and independently chooses an action at each round), stochastic (the next state is determined by a probability distribution depending on the current state and the chosen actions), in nite (the game continues for an in nite num...