Reflections about pseudo-dual prices in combinatorial auctions

Combinatorial Auctions via Posted Prices

We study anonymous posted price mechanisms for combinatorial auctions in a Bayesian framework. In a posted price mechanism, item prices are posted, then the consumers approach the seller sequentially in an arbitrary order, each purchasing her favorite bundle from among the unsold items at the posted prices. These mechanisms are simple, transparent and trivially dominant strategy incentive compa...

An Analysis of Linear Prices in Iterative Combinatorial Auctions

Ask prices are the most essential form of information feedback in Iterative Combinatorial Auctions (ICA) and vital in achieving an efficient auction outcome. Different pricing concepts have been analyzed in the literature, including linear, non-linear and discriminative non-linear prices. Linear prices, i.e. per-item prices, are intuitive and easy to understand for bidders, however, under certa...

Prices and Compact Bidding Languages for Combinatorial Auctions

Combinatorial auctions are currently used for a wide variety of B2B commerce, most notably for industrial procurement of raw materials and shipping lanes, and in the government sector for the allocation of spectrum licenses, wholesale electricity generation, and the proposed control of airport congestion through the auctioning of landing-slot rights. In this paper we summarize the contributions...

On the Robustness of Primal-Dual Iterative Combinatorial Auctions

Though the VCG auction assumes a central place in the mechanism design literature, there are a number of reasons for favouring iterative combinatorial auction designs. Several promising ascending auction formats have been developed throughout the past few years based on primal-dual algorithms and linear programming theory. Prices are interpreted as a feasible dual solution and the provisional a...

Bidding in Combinatorial Auctions