Regulating Damage Clauses in (Labor) Contracts
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Labor market pooling , outsourcing and labor contracts
Labor Market Pooling, Outsourcing and Labor Contracts Economic regions, such as urban agglomerations, face external demand and price shocks that produce income risk. Workers in large and diversified agglomerations may benefit from reduced wage volatility, while firms may outsource the production of intermediate goods and realize benefits from Chamberlinian externalities. Firms may also protect ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
سال: 2007
ISSN: 0932-4569
DOI: 10.1628/093245607783242936