Regulating Prices in Competitive Markets

Factors Affecting Indiana Electricity Prices in Competitive Markets

Competitive prices of homogeneous goods in multilateral markets

We introduce a subclass of multi-sided assignment games that embodies markets with different types of firms that produce different types of homogeneous goods. These markets generalize bilateral Böhm-Bawerk horse markets. We describe the geometric and algebraic structure of the core, which is always nonempty. We also characterize the extreme points of the core and show that they are marginal wor...

Equilibrium Model for Commodity Prices: Competitive and Monopolistic Markets∗

In this article, we develop an equilibrium model for storable commodity prices. The model is formulated as a stochastic dynamic control problem and considers two state variables the exogenous supply and the inventory. The inventory is a fully controllable endogenous variable. We assume that the uncertainty arises from the supply, which evolves as a Ornstein-Uhlenbeck stochastic process. This mo...

Generalized three-sided assignment markets: core and competitive prices∗

A class of three-sided assignment markets is considered, where value is generated by pairs or triplets of agents belonging to different sectors, as well as by individuals. For these markets we represent the situation that arises when some agents leave the market with some payoff by means of a generalization of Owen (1992) derived market. Consistency with respect to the derived market, together ...

CSEM WP 143R The Short-Run Effects of Time-Varying Prices in Competitive Electricity Markets

We analyze the efficiency, distributional, and environmental effects of real-time pricing (RTP) adoption in the short run. Consistent with theory, our simulations of the PJM electricity market show that RTP adoption improves efficiency and compresses the distributions of loads and prices. Adoption increases average load but decreases operating profits with the largest decrease for oil-fired gen...