REGULATION OF ANTI-CORRUPTION ENFORCEMENT IN CHINA
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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As in most of the developing countries, corruption is becoming one of the serious challenges in the process China is striding forward to modernization. However, corruption in China is different in nature and extent from that in other nations due to the political structure and reform policy China has implemented. This paper devotes to differentiating typologies of corruption, analyzing the cause...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Foreign Legislation and Comparative Law
سال: 2018
ISSN: 1991-3222,2587-9995
DOI: 10.12737/art.2018.2.10