Regulator Leniency and Mispricing in Beneficent Nonprofits

Primum Non Nocere: Beneficent Deception

Systematic Mispricing

We provide statistical estimates of individual security mispricing which is defined as the departure of the market price from the prediction of a fundamental asset pricing model. We show that there is a return premium associated with systematic mispricing risk which is the dependence of the individual security mispricing on a market wide mispricing factor. The risk or characteristic-adjusted re...

Managerial Pay and Governance in American Nonprofits

This article examines the compensation of top managers of nonprofits in the United States using panel data from tax returns of the organizations from 1992 to 1996. Studying managers in nonprofits is particularly interesting given the difficulty in measuring performance. The article examines many areas commonly studied in the executive pay (within for-profit firms) literature. It explores pay di...

Optimal Corporate Leniency Programs∗

This study characterizes the corporate leniency policy that minimizes the frequency with which collusion occurs. Though it can be optimal to provide only partial leniency, plausible sufficient conditions are provided whereby the antitrust authority should waive all penalties for the first firm to come forward. It is also shown that restrictions should be placed on when amnesty is awarded, thoug...

Rational Mispricing and Irrational Mispricing in Betting Markets: Implications for Market Effi ciency Tests∗

Testing market effi ciency in betting markets does not necessarily get around the joint hypothesis problem because the result depends on the assumed role of bookmakers. In a simple model of monopolistic competition, bookmakers’ rational pricing induces the Favorite-Longshot Bias even without bettors’irrationality (Rational Mispricing) and accommodates bettors’irrational beliefs to exploit betti...