Relational Contracts and Trust in a High-Tech Industry
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Strategic alliances in the high-tech industry
Foreword Krzysztof Klincewicz's book is of outstanding interest for business practitioners in the high-tech sector, as well as scholars and policy makers. In recent years, there has been growing pressure on firms to give higher priority to R&D and at the same time to improve their R&D effectiveness. These pressures are associated with the accelerating rate of product innovations, shorter produc...
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W study capacity reservation contracts between a high-tech manufacturer (supplier) and her oem customer (buyer). The supplier and the buyer are partners who enter a “design-win” agreement to develop the product, and who share the stochastic demand information. To encourage the supplier for more aggressive capacity expansion, the buyer reserves capacity upfront by paying a deductible fee. As cap...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Social Science Research Network
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['1556-5068']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3950097