Relational Contracts, Taxation and the Household

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Relational Contracts, Taxation and the Household

Relational Contracts, Taxation and the Household This paper applies the theory of relational contracts to make precise the idea that because households are engaged in a repeated non-cooperative game, Pareto efficient outcomes can be supported by self interest, given the specific pattern of specialisation and exchange which exists in the household. The household’s choice of a particular solution...

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: CESifo Economic Studies

سال: 2011

ISSN: 1610-241X,1612-7501

DOI: 10.1093/cesifo/ifr013