Relational Privacy: Surveillance, Common Knowledge, and Coordination
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Coordination, Timing and Common Knowledge
We sometimes choose to do things only because other people are doing them. David Hume referred to the behavior chosen in such situations as conventions. A leading example of a convention for Hume and philosophers following him was language. Since everyone else uses the word "cat" to refer a cat and the word "dog" to refer to a dog, I also do so, but if everyone was using "cat" to refer to a dog...
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Research on human cooperation has concentrated on the puzzle of altruism, in which 1 actor incurs a cost to benefit another, and the psychology of reciprocity, which evolved to solve this problem. We examine the complementary puzzle of mutualism, in which actors can benefit each other simultaneously, and the psychology of coordination, which ensures such benefits. Coordination is facilitated by...
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Tous droits réservés. All rights reserved. Reproduction partielle permise avec citation du document source, incluant la notice ©. Short sections may be quoted without explicit permission, if full credit, including © notice, is given to the source. Le CIRANO collabore avec de nombreux centres et chaires de recherche universitaires dont on peut consulter la liste sur son site web. Les cahiers de ...
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Recent social and technical developments are expanding surveillance by the government and private sector and intensifying privacy concerns, resulting in a surveillance-privacy dilemma. Governments establish surveillance schemes to fight terrorism and crime. Private organizations use profiling and data mining techniques to target marketing endeavors, to analyze customer behavior and monitor the ...
متن کاملImperfect Common Knowledge of Preferences in Global Coordination Games∗
I study a simple global game, in which I relax the assumption that preferences are common knowledge. I show that with higher-order uncertainty regarding preferences, players can at best coordinate on the risk-dominant equilibrium, regardless of whether information about fundamentals is common or private. The example also suggests that the strength of the coordinating effect of public informatio...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2016
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2864663