Relationship-Specific Investment as A Barrier to Entry
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Entry regulation as a barrier to entrepreneurship
Using a comprehensive database of European firms, we study the effect of market entry regulations on the creation of new limited-liability firms, the average size of entrants, and the growth of incumbent firms. We find that costly regulations hamper the creation of new firms, especially in industries that should naturally have high entry. These regulations also force new entrants to be see fron...
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This study analyses employers‘ support for the introduction of industry-specifi c minimum wages as a cost-raising strategy in order to deter market entry. Using a unique data set consisting of 800 fi rms in the German service sector, we fi nd some evidence that high-productivity employers support minimum wages. We further show that minimum wage support is higher in industries and regions with l...
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This study analyses employers‘ support for the introduction of industry-specifi c minimum wages as a cost-raising strategy in order to deter market entry. Using a unique data set consisting of 800 fi rms in the German service sector, we fi nd some evidence that high-productivity employers support minimum wages. We further show that minimum wage support is higher in industries and regions with l...
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The received wisdom is that sunk costs create a barrier to entry—if entry fails, then the entrant, unable to recover sunk costs, incurs greater losses. In a strategic context where an incumbent may prey on the entrant, sunk entry costs have a countervailing effect: they may effectively commit the entrant to stay in the market. By providing the entrant with commitment power, sunk investments may...
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Exclusive contracts prohibit one or both parties from trading with anyone else. Contrary to earlier findings, notably Segal and Whinston (2000), we show that investments that are specific to the contracted parties may be encouraged. Results depend on the nature of the investments and whether the bargaining is cooperative or non-cooperative. The major part of the analysis show that exclusive con...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2011
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1948073