Remedies vs. Extreme Options in Merger Control

Efficiency Gains and Structural Remedies in Merger Control∗

This paper studies the role of structural remedies in merger control in a Cournot setting where (endogenous) mergers are motivated by prospective efficiency gains. Every merger has to be submitted to an Antitrust Authority (AA) which, apart from blocking or unconditionally approving it, might approve a modified version of the concentration where divestitures are required. Some important merger ...

Merger Remedies : A Preliminary Empirical Assessment

EU Merger Remedies: A Preliminary Empirical Assessment

Mergers that substantially lessen competition are challenged by antitrust authorities. Instead of blocking anticompetitive transitions straight away, authorities might choose to negotiate with the merging parties and allow the transactions to proceed with modifications that restore or preserve the competition in the involved markets. We study a sample of 167 mergers that were under the European...

Options with Extreme Strikes

In this short paper, we study the asymptotics for the price of call options for very large strikes and put options for very small strikes. The stock price is assumed to follow the Black–Scholes models. We analyze European, Asian, American, Parisian and perpetual options and conclude that the tail asymptotics for these option types fall into four scenarios.

Control Variate Remedies

Other than common random numbers, control varlates is the most promising variance reduction technique in terms of its potential for widespread use: Control variates is applicable in single or multiple response simulation, it does not require altering the simulation run in any way, and any stochastic simulation contains potential control variates. A rich theory of control variates has been devel...