Repeated Games with Bounded Entropy
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Repeated Games with Bounded Entropy
We investigate the asymptotic behavior of the maxmin values of repeated two-person zero-sum games with a bound on the strategic entropy of the maximizer’s strategies while the other player is unrestricted. We will show that if the Ž . bound h n , a function of the number of repetitions n, satisfies the condition Ž . Ž . nŽ Ž .. Ž .Ž . h n rn a g n a ` , then the maxmin value W h n converges to ...
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A great deal of attention has been paid recently to repeated games with bounded complexity. References [3, 5, 63 and others deal with repeated games played by automata. In this case the set of strategies is reduced to the set of those strategies that can be realized by automata. Here we address ourselves to repeated games played by players with bounded recall who do not know the stage in which ...
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Actions in a repeated or stochastic game can in principle depend on all previous outcomes. Given this vast policy space, human players may often be forced to use heuristics that base actions on incomplete information, such as the outcomes of only the most recent trials. Here it is proven that such bounded rationality is often fully rational, in that the optimal policy with respect to some limit...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2000
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1006/game.1999.0725