Repeated games with one-memory
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Repeated games with one-memory
We study the extent to which equilibrium payoffs of discounted repeated games can be obtained by 1 – memory strategies. We establish the following in games with perfect (rich) action spaces: First, when the players are sufficiently patient, the subgame perfect Folk Theorem holds with 1 – memory. Second, for arbitrary level of discounting, all strictly enforceable subgame perfect equilibrium pay...
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We study the extent to which equilibrium payoffs of discounted repeated games can be obtained by 1 – memory strategies. To this end, we provide a complete characterization of the 1 – memory simple strategies and use it in games with 3 or more players each having a connected action space, to show that: 1. all subgame perfect payoffs can be approximately supported by a 1 – memory contemporaneous ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 2009
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2008.04.003