Repeated moral hazard with persistence
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Repeated Moral Hazard with Persistence∗
This paper considers the optimal contract when the current (hidden) action of an agent has a persistent effect on the future outcome. In this setting, the current outcome is not only a signal of the current action taken by the agent, but also conveys information about his past actions. The optimal contract in a two-effort choice, two-period setting is characterized analytically and numerically....
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economic Theory
سال: 2005
ISSN: 0938-2259,1432-0479
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-004-0488-2