Repeated signaling games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Repeated signaling games
A class of repeated signaling games is analyzed. It is shown that costly signaling is possible even in periods after types are revealed. A reasonable belief system that supports least cost separating equilibria (LCSE) is introduced. Possible time patterns of signaling in a LCSE are characterized.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2009
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2008.09.030