Replicator dynamics of an N-player snowdrift game with delayed payoffs
نویسندگان
چکیده
We consider a version of the N-player snowdrift game in which payoffs obtained by players are delayed. The delay is shown to lead Hopf bifurcation with an associated critical value time replicator dynamics. For delays larger than delay, dynamics oscillate around equilibrium instead asymptotically approaching it. dependence this on parameters determined. After developing analysis for 2-player game, same methodology applied show how results change as function N, concluding limiting case large numbers players.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Applied Mathematics and Computation
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['1873-5649', '0096-3003']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2021.126204