Replicator Dynamics of Symmetric Ultimatum Game
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
The replicator equation and other game dynamics.
The replicator equation is the first and most important game dynamics studied in connection with evolutionary game theory. It was originally developed for symmetric games with finitely many strategies. Properties of these dynamics are briefly summarized for this case, including the convergence to and stability of the Nash equilibria and evolutionarily stable strategies. The theory is then exten...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Dynamic Games and Applications
سال: 2012
ISSN: 2153-0785,2153-0793
DOI: 10.1007/s13235-012-0044-9