Representing pure Nash equilibria in argumentation
نویسندگان
چکیده
In this paper we describe an argumentation-based representation of normal form games, and demonstrate how argumentation can be used to compute pure strategy Nash equilibria. Our approach builds on Modgil’s Extended Argumentation Frameworks. We its correctness, showprove several theoretical properties it satisfies, outline explain why certain strategies are equilibria a non-expert human user.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Argument & Computation
سال: 2022
ISSN: ['1946-2174', '1946-2166']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.3233/aac-210007