Reputation in Marketing Channels: Repeated-Transactions Bargaining with Two-Sided Uncertainty
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Endogenous Two-Sided Markets with Repeated Transactions
We consider homogeneous two-sided markets, in which connected buyer-seller pairs bargain and trade repeatedly. In this infinite market game with exogenous matching probabilities and a common discount factor, we prove the existence of equilibria in stationary strategies. The equilibrium payoffs are given implicitly as a solution to a system of linear equations. Then, we endogenize the matching m...
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Consider a two-person intertemporal bargaining problem in which players choose actions and o¤ers each period and collect payo¤s (as function of that periods actions) while bargaining proceeds. This can alternatively be viewed as an in nitely-repeated game wherein players can o¤er one another enforceable contracts that govern play for the rest of the game. Theory is silent regarding how the sur...
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Bilateral bargaining has received a lot of attention in the multi–agent literature and has been studied with different approaches. According to the strategic approach, bargaining is modeled as a non–cooperative game with uncertain information and infinite actions. Its resolution is a long–standing open problem and no algorithm addressing uncertainty over multiple parameters is known. In this pa...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Marketing Science
سال: 2002
ISSN: 0732-2399,1526-548X
DOI: 10.1287/mksc.21.3.251.146