Reputation in multi-unit ascending auction with common values
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Reputation in Multi-unit Ascending Auction with Common Values
This paper considers a multi-unit ascending auction with two players and common values. A large set of equilibria in this model is not robust to a small reputational perturbation. In particular, if there is a positive probability that there is a type who always demands many units, regardless of price, then the model has a unique equilibrium payo¤ pro le. If this uncertainty is only on one side,...
متن کاملAn Efficient Multi-Unit Ascending Auction
We provide an ascending auction that yields an efficient outcome when there are many identical units for sale and bidders have interdependent values and downward-sloping demand. Our ascending auction both extends and generalizes Ausubel’s (2004) and yields the same outcome as Perry and Reny’s (2002) generalization of Vickrey’s (1961) sealed-bid auction. There are two key features of our auction...
متن کاملAn E¢ cient Multi-Unit Ascending Auction
We provide an ascending auction that yields an e¢ cient outcome when there are many identical units for sale and bidders have interdependent values and downward-sloping demand. Our ascending auction both extends and generalizes Ausubels (1997) and yields the same outcome as Perry and Renys (2002) generalization of Vickreys (1961) sealed-bid auction. There are two key features of our auction....
متن کاملMulti-Unit Auction Revenue with Possibilistic Beliefs
The revenue of traditional auction mechanisms is benchmarked solely against the players’ own valuations, despite the fact that they may also have valuable beliefs about each other’s valuations. Not much is known about generating revenue in auctions of multiple identical copies of a same good. (In particular the celebrated Vickrey mechanism has no revenue guarantees.) For such auctions, we (1) p...
متن کاملBidder Behavior in a Common Value Simultaneous Ascending Auction
We develop and experimentally test a model of bidder behavior in a simultaneous ascending auction for heterogeneous common value goods. The model follows the ‘straightforward’ strategy developed by Milgrom (2000) while accounting for the adverse selection effect and the potential for the winner’s curse. When this model is evaluated against laboratory results we find that bidders deviate from th...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economics Letters
سال: 2013
ISSN: 0165-1765
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.10.007