REPUTATIONAL BIDDING
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Reputational cheap talk∗
This paper analyzes information reporting by a privately informed expert concerned about being perceived to have accurate information. When the expert’s reputation is updated on the basis of the report as well as the realized state, the expert typically does not wish to truthfully reveal the signal observed. The incentives to deviate from truthtelling are characterized and shown to depend on th...
متن کاملReputational bargaining and deadlines
How will agents behave when bargaining in the face of an upcoming deadline? If irrational types exist, committed to their bargaining positions, rational agents will imitate this tough behavior to gain reputational benefits, even though this may result in the deadline being missed. Notably, if agents are patient and irrational types are committed to fixed demands then agreement must necessarily ...
متن کاملReputational bargaining and deadlines
I introduce irrational types, who are committed to their demands, into a bargaining model with an uncertain deadline for agreement. Rational agents imitate these demands, hoping to benefit from a “tough” reputation. When irrational types are committed to fixed demands and agents are patient, this provides an explanation for “deadline effects” in bargaining: agreement is “U-shaped”, occurring ei...
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We study a dynamic moral hazard model, where a firm can invest into the quality of its product which, in turn, is imperfectly observed by consumers. We analyse how investment incentives depend on the firm’s reputation and the information structure of consumer learning, and solve for the resulting reputational dynamics. When consumers learn through good news, investment incentives are increasing...
متن کاملReputational Learning and Network Dynamics
In many real world networks agents are initially unsure of each other’s qualities and must learn about each other over time via repeated interactions. This paper is the first to provide a methodology for studying the dynamics of such networks, taking into account that agents differ from each other, that they begin with incomplete information, and that they must learn through past experiences wh...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Economic Review
سال: 2014
ISSN: 0020-6598
DOI: 10.1111/iere.12067