منابع مشابه
Nature and Validity of Contracts in Stem Cell Therapeutic Research
One of the most influential scientific approaches in the twentieth century has been discovering stem cells and their therapeutic effectiveness. On the one hand, countless diseases are considered incurable through valid scientific treatments and on the other hand, the hope for new treatments has been considered a promotor of the medical studies in research centers. Throughout such research piece...
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Innovation is essential for sustaining growth and economic development in a world that faces population increase, natural resource depletion, and environmental challenges. Incentives play a critical role in innovation because the required research and development activities are costly, and the resulting knowledge has the attributes of a public good. This paper discusses the economics of institu...
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Various theories make predictions about the relative advantages of individual loans versus joint liability loans. If we imagine that lenders facing moral hazard make relative performance comparisons in determining stringency in repayment, then individual loans should vary positively with covariance of output across funded projects. Relatively new work also highlights inequality and heterogeneit...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Nature
سال: 1972
ISSN: 0028-0836,1476-4687
DOI: 10.1038/235447d0