Resource-monotonicity and population-monotonicity in connected cake-cutting
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Resource-monotonicity and Population-monotonicity in Connected Cake-cutting
In the classic cake-cutting problem (Steinhaus, 1948), a heterogeneous resource has to be divided among n agents with different valuations in a proportional way — giving each agent a piece with a value of at least 1/n of the total. In many applications, such as dividing a land-estate or a time-interval, it is also important that the pieces are connected. We propose two additional requirements: ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Mathematical Social Sciences
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0165-4896
DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2018.07.001