Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems
We study a simple model of assigning indivisible objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We completely describe all rules satisfying efficiency, independence of irrelevant objects, and resource-monotonicity. The characterized rules assign the objects in a sequence of steps such that at each step t...
متن کاملCorrigendum to "Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems"
Ehlers and Klaus (2003) study so-called house allocation problems and claim to characterize all rules satisfying efficiency, independence of irrelevant objects, and resource-monotonicity on two preference domains (Ehlers and Klaus, 2003, Theorem 1). They explicitly prove Theorem 1 for preference domain R0 which requires that the null object is always the worst object and mention that the corres...
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In this paper, we consider an online resource allocation problem, where buyers with limited budgets are interested in purchasing items that consume a limited amount of resources. In general, there is no nontrivial performance guarantee for the worst cases. However, after imposing two reasonable restrictions, we can propose two online algorithms, a greedy algorithm and a primal dual algorithm, w...
متن کاملPareto Optimality in House Allocation Problems
We study Pareto optimal matchings in the context of house allocation problems. We present an O( √ nm) algorithm, based on Gale’s Top Trading Cycles Method, for finding a maximum cardinality Pareto optimal matching, where n is the number of agents and m is the total length of the preference lists. By contrast, we show that the problem of finding a minimum cardinality Pareto optimal matching is N...
متن کاملCounting Popular Matchings in House Allocation Problems
We study the problem of counting the number of popular matchings in a given instance. McDermid and Irving gave a poly-time algorithm for counting the number of popular matchings when the preference lists are strictly ordered. We first consider the case of ties in preference lists. Nasre proved that the problem of counting the number of popular matching is #P-hard when there are ties. We give an...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Games Theory
سال: 2004
ISSN: 0020-7276,1432-1270
DOI: 10.1007/s001820400177