منابع مشابه
Costly Coasean Bargaining and Property Right Security
This paper examines how transaction costs affect Coasean bargaining with secure and insecure property rights in the lab. Consistent with the theory that secure property rights lowers the cost of non-cooperation, we find that bargaining efficiency is inversely related to property right security. Less secure property rights increased economic efficiency twofold. Property owners with secure rights...
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Although marginal cost pricing is necessary for welfare maximization, firms that produce under conditions of decreasing average cost incur losses if they price at marginal cost. In this paper, the Coase two-part tariN is extended to several cases of common costs by assessing surplus in order to recover the losses of the regulated natural monopolist; the existence of equilibria in these cases is...
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We argue that, in exchange economies, various versions of the bargaining set cannot be implemented in Nash equilibrium. We then propose an extensive form mechanism that exactly implements the Aumann–Davis–Maschler bargaining set in subgame perfect equilibrium. The mechanism corresponds closely to the description of the bargaining set and respects feasibility in and out of equilibrium. Journal o...
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This article is a survey on bargaining theory. The focus is the game theoretic approach to bargaining, both on its axiomatic and strategic counterparts. The application of bargaining theory to large markets and its connections with competitive allocations are also discussed. Journal of Economic Literature classification: C7. Bargaining In the simplest definition, we refer to bargaining as a soc...
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Using a simple bilateral trading example with discrete valuations and costs it is demonstrated that in the presence of private information the efficiency of Coasean bargaining may be strictly enhanced if initially no property rights are assigned.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Public Economics
سال: 2013
ISSN: 0047-2727
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2012.11.002