Restricted Domains of Dichotomous Preferences with Possibly Incomplete Information

نویسندگان

چکیده

Restricted domains over voter preferences have been extensively studied within the area of computational social choice, initially for that are total orders set alternatives and subsequently dichotomous—i.e., correspond to approved disapproved alternatives. This paper contributes latter stream work in a twofold manner. First, we obtain forbidden subprofile characterisations various important dichotomous domains. Then, concerned with incomplete profiles may arise many real-world scenarios, where partial information about voters’ preferences. We tackle problem determining whether an profile admits completion certain restricted domain design constructive, polynomial algorithms effect.

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Proceedings of the ... AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence

سال: 2021

ISSN: ['2159-5399', '2374-3468']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v35i6.16718