Retailer's credit preference under perfect competition Based on the Stackelberg model

mortality forecasting based on lee-carter model

over the past decades a number of approaches have been applied for forecasting mortality. in 1992, a new method for long-run forecast of the level and age pattern of mortality was published by lee and carter. this method was welcomed by many authors so it was extended through a wider class of generalized, parametric and nonlinear model. this model represents one of the most influential recent d...

Supply Chain Contracting Under Competition: Bilateral Bargaining vs. Stackelberg

W e analyze contracting behaviors in a two-tier supply chain system consisting of competing manufacturers and competing retailers. We contrast the contracting outcome of a Stackelberg game, in which the manufacturers offer take-itor-leave-it contracts to the retailers, with that of a bargaining game, in which the firms bilaterally negotiate contract terms via a process of alternating offers. Th...

Classes of Service Under Perfect Competition

On the conditional and partial trade credit policy with capital constraints: A Stackelberg model ¬リニ

For the two-echelon supply chain with stable market demand, by taking the supplier’s capital constraint into consideration, we establish a conditional and partial trade credit model, which actually is a Stackelberg model with the supplier being a leader in the game. By analyzing two parties’ optimal decisions in the game, we provide the supplier with a threshold for setting the model. The model...

Studies on Horizontal Competition among Homogenous Retailers Based on Agent-based Approach

This paper adopts agent-based simulation to study the horizontal competition among homogenous price-setting retailers in a one-to-many supply chain (one supplier and multiple retailers). We model the supplier and retailers as agents, and design their behavioral rules respectively. The results show that although the agents learn individually based on their own experiences, the system shows an as...