Retained earnings dynamic, internal promotions and Walrasian equilibrium
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Retained earnings dynamic, internal promotions and Walrasian equilibrium
In the early stages of the process of industry evolution, firms are financially constrained and might pay different wages to workers according to their expectations about the prospects for advancement offered by each firm’s job ladder. This paper argues that, nevertheless, if the output market is competitive, the positive predictions of the perfectly competitive model are still a good descripti...
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A class of bargaining games in which agents bargain over prices and maximum trading constraints is considered: It is proved that all the Stationary Subgame Perfect Equilibria of these games implement Walrasian allocations as the bargaining frictions vanish. The result holds for any number of agents and is robust to different specifications of the bargaining process. © 2011 Published by Elsevier...
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We present a family of submodular valuation classes that generalizes gross substitute. We show that Walrasian equilibrium always exist for one class in this family, and there is a natural ascending auction which finds it. We prove some new structural properties on gross-substitute auctions which, in turn, show that the known ascending auctions for this class (Gul-Stacchetti and Ausbel) are, in ...
متن کاملWalrasian Equilibrium with Gross Substitutes
Sloan Foundation for their support. We are grateful to Vincent Crawford who provided valuable comments and pointed out to us the connection between Kelso and Crawford [5] and our work, to John Geanakoplos for suggesting a weakening of our main assumption, and to Don Brown for valuable comments.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 2008
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2007.06.008