Revenue-Capped Efficient Auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Revenue equivalence in asymmetric auctions
The Revenue Equivalence Theorem is generalized to the case of asymmetric auctions in which each player’s valuation is drawn independently from a common support according to his/her distribution function. r 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. JEL classification: D44; D72; D82
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of the European Economic Association
سال: 2019
ISSN: 1542-4766,1542-4774
DOI: 10.1093/jeea/jvz015