Revenue equivalence in multi-object auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Revenue equivalence in asymmetric auctions
The Revenue Equivalence Theorem is generalized to the case of asymmetric auctions in which each player’s valuation is drawn independently from a common support according to his/her distribution function. r 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. JEL classification: D44; D72; D82
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We consider an auction with risk neutral agents having independent private valuations for several heterogenous objects. Most of the literature on revenuemaximizing auctions has focused on the sale of one good or on the sale of several identical units (thus yielding one-dimensional informational models). Two reasons for ine¢ciency in revenue-maximizing auctions have been identi...ed 1) The (mono...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economics Letters
سال: 1988
ISSN: 0165-1765
DOI: 10.1016/0165-1765(88)90044-4