منابع مشابه
Characterization of Revenue Equivalence
The property of an allocation rule to be implementable in dominant strategies by a unique payment scheme is called revenue equivalence. In this paper we give a characterization of revenue equivalence based on a graph theoretic interpretation of the incentive compatibility constraints. The characterization holds for any (possibly infinite) outcome space and many of the known results about revenu...
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The conventional wisdom in the auction design literature is that first price sealed bid auctions tend to make more money while ascending auctions tend to be more efficient. We re-examine these issues in an environment in which bidders are allowed to endogenously choose in which auction format to participate. Our findings are that more bidders choose to enter the ascending auction than the first...
متن کاملRevenue guarantee in auction with common prior
This paper considers auction environments with a (possibly correlated) common prior over bidders’ values, where each bidder may have additional information (e.g., through information acquisition). We characterize the optimal mechanisms in terms of the expected revenue that is guaranteed given whatever additional information is available to the bidders. Specifically, we show that (i) a second-pr...
متن کاملRevenue equivalence in asymmetric auctions
The Revenue Equivalence Theorem is generalized to the case of asymmetric auctions in which each player’s valuation is drawn independently from a common support according to his/her distribution function. r 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. JEL classification: D44; D72; D82
متن کاملMonotonicity, Revenue Equivalence and Budgets
We study multidimensional mechanism design in a common scenario where players have private information about their willingness to pay and their ability to pay. We provide a complete characterization of dominant-strategy incentive-compatible direct mechanisms where overreporting the budget is not possible. In several settings, reporting larger budgets can be made suboptimal with a small randomiz...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Economic Review
سال: 2019
ISSN: 0002-8282
DOI: 10.1257/aer.20180773