Revisiting the Concrete Security of Goldreich’s Pseudorandom Generator

Concrete Security of the Blum-Blum-Shub Pseudorandom Generator

The asymptotic security of the Blum-Blum-Shub (BBS) pseudorandom generator has been studied by Alexi et al. and Vazirani and Vazirani, who proved independently that O(log log N) bits can be extracted on each iteration, where N is the modulus (a Blum integer). The concrete security of this generator has been analyzed previously by Fischlin and Schnorr and by Knuth. In this paper we continue to a...

Pseudorandom Functions Revisited: The Cascade Construction and Its Concrete Security

Pseudorandom function families are a powerful cryptographic primitive, yielding, in particular, simple solutions for the main problems in private key cryptography. Their existence based on general assumptions (namely, the existence of one-way functions) has been established. In this work we investigate new ways of designing pseudorandom function families. The goal is to find constructions that ...

MUGI Pseudorandom Number Generator

the effect of taftan pozzolan on the compressive strength of concrete in the environmental conditions of oman sea (chabahar port)

cement is an essential ingredient in the concrete buildings. for production of cement considerable amount of fossil fuel and electrical energy is consumed. on the other hand for generating one tone of portland cement, nearly one ton of carbon dioxide is released. it shows that 7 percent of the total released carbon dioxide in the world relates to the cement industry. considering ecological issu...

Minimizing the Complexity of Goldreich's Pseudorandom Generator

In the study of cryptography in NC, it was previously known that Goldreich’s candidate pseudorandom generator (PRG) is insecure when instantiated with a predicate P in 4 or fewer variables, if one wants to achieve polynomial stretch (that is, stretching n bits to n bits for some constant > 0). The current standard candidate predicate for this setting is the “tri-sumand” predicate TSA(x) = XOR3⊕...