Risk Incentive Problems between a Lender & a Borrower and Possible Ways for Mitigation
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
A risk incentive problem for a lender and a borrower when an additional asset is used as security
A typical problem in financial contracting is the so-called risk-shifting incentive problem. In many cases, this problem in financial contracting, which typically arises in the context of a lender-borrower relationship, means the borrower’s incentive to influence the risk of his project. In particular, the shareholders of a levered firm will behave so as to maximize the value of their shares si...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Procedia Computer Science
سال: 2013
ISSN: 1877-0509
DOI: 10.1016/j.procs.2013.05.114