Risk-sensitive mean field games with major and minor players

نویسندگان

چکیده

We investigate a class of mean field games containing large number major and minor players. Each player minimizes quadratic-tracking type risk-sensitive cost functional, where the reference signal is function state average term To reduce complexity for solving problem, we design sequence decentralized strategies by Nash certainty equivalence principle. Firstly, optimal control problems with quadratic functionals, propose new verification theorem. Secondly, apply two-layer aggregation method to construct fixed-point equations estimations terms give conditions existence uniqueness fixed points. Then, based on local information. It shown that are consistent true values closed-loop systems, designed asymptotic equilibrium. Finally, effectiveness theoretical analysis demonstrated numerical example.

برای دانلود رایگان متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Risk-Sensitive Mean-Field Stochastic Differential Games

In this paper, we study a class of risk-sensitive mean-field stochastic differential games. Under regularity assumptions, we use results from standard risk-sensitive differential game theory to show that the mean-field value of the exponentiated cost functional coincides with the value function of a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Fleming (HJBF) equation with an additional quadratic term. We provide an...

متن کامل

Risk-Sensitive Mean-Field-Type Games with Lp-norm Drifts

We study how risk-sensitive players act in situations where the outcome is influenced not only by the state-action profile but also by the distribution of it. In such interactive decision-making problems, the classical mean-field game framework does not apply. We depart from most of the mean-field games literature by presuming that a decision-maker may include its own-state distribution in its ...

متن کامل

Backward-forward linear-quadratic mean-field games with major and minor agents

This paper studies the backward-forward linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) games with major and minor agents (players). The state of major agent follows a linear backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE) and the states of minor agents are governed by linear forward stochastic differential equations (SDEs). The major agent is dominating as its state enters those of minor agents. On the other...

متن کامل

Mean Field Stochastic Games with Discrete States and Mixed Players

We consider mean field Markov decision processes with a major player and a large number of minor players which have their individual objectives. The players have decoupled state transition laws and are coupled by the costs via the state distribution of the minor players. We introduce a stochastic difference equation to model the update of the limiting state distribution process and solve limiti...

متن کامل

Mean Field Games and Systemic Risk

We propose a simple model of inter-bank borrowing and lending where the evolution of the logmonetary reserves of N banks is described by a system of diffusion processes coupled through their drifts in such a way that stability of the system depends on the rate of inter-bank borrowing and lending. Systemic risk is characterized by a large number of banks reaching a default threshold by a given t...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: ESAIM: Control, Optimisation and Calculus of Variations

سال: 2023

ISSN: ['1262-3377', '1292-8119']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1051/cocv/2022082