Robust Bilateral Trade and Mediated Bargaining

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Robust Bilateral Trade and Mediated Bargaining∗

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Journal of the European Economic Association

سال: 2008

ISSN: 1542-4766,1542-4774

DOI: 10.1162/jeea.2008.6.2-3.570