Robust Comparative Statics in Large Dynamic Economies

Robust Comparative Statics in Large Dynamic Economies

We consider infinite-horizon economies populated by a continuum of agents subject to idiosyncratic shocks. This framework contains models of saving and capital accumulation with incomplete markets in the spirit of works by Bewley, Aiyagari, and Huggett, models of entry, exit and industry dynamics in the spirit of Hopenhayn’s work as well as dynamic models of occupational choice and search model...

Robust Comparative Statics

Comparative Statics in Matching Markets

This paper studies the comparative statics of adding agents to matching markets that generalize the marriage and college-admissions markets of D. Gale and L. Shapley (Amer. Math. Monrh1.v 69, 1962, 9915). It is shown, for the wide class of matching markets studied by A. Roth (Econometrica 52, 1984, 47-57), that adding an agent to one side of the market weakens the competitive positions of the o...

Aggregate comparative statics

In aggregative games, each player’s payoff depends on her own actions and an aggregate of the actions of all the players (for example, sum, product or some moment of the distribution of actions). Many common games in industrial organization, political economy, public economics, and macroeconomics can be cast as aggregative games. In most of these situations, the behavior of the aggregate is of ...

Distributional Comparative Statics

An important set of questions in economics concern how changes in the distribution of economic parameters (income, wealth, productivity, distortions, information, etc.) impact individual choices and market outcomes. We currently do not have tools to answer such questions. In this paper, I develop a theory of distributional comparative statics that addresses this set of issues. Central to the de...