Robust Information Aggregation Through Voting
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Correlation Neglect, Voting Behaviour and Information Aggregation
In this paper we analyse elections when voters underestimate the correlation between their information sources (“correlation neglect”). We find that this cognitive bias can improve political outcomes. We show that the extreme beliefs which result from correlation neglect induce some voters to base their vote on information rather than on political preferences. We characterise conditions on the ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2019
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3406694