Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation
A contract with multiple agents may be susceptible to collusion. We show that agents’ collusion imposes no cost in a large class of circumstances with risk neutral agents, including both uncorrelated and correlated types. In those circumstances, any payoff the principal can attain in the absence of collusion, including the secondbest level, can be attained in the presence of collusion in a way ...
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A contract with multiple agents may be susceptible to collusion. We show that agents’ collusion can be prevented at no cost in a large class of circumstances with risk neutral agents — virtually all circumstances with uncorrelated types and a broad set of circumstances with correlated types. In those circumstances, an optimal outcome in the absence of collusion can be made collusion proof, in a...
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Because of its devastating effects in auctions and other mechanisms, collusion is prohibited and legally prosecuted. Yet, colluders have always existed, and may continue to exist. We thus raise the following question for mechanism design: What desiderata are achievable, and by what type of mechanisms, when any set of players who wish to collude are free to do so without any restrictions on the ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Econometrica
سال: 2006
ISSN: 0012-9682,1468-0262
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00694.x