Robustness of Relational Contracts to Interruptions in Employer-Worker Gift Exchange Experiments
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Can Relational Contracts Survive Stochastic Interruptions?
This paper investigates the robustness of the “two-tiered labor market” experimental results of Brown, Falk and Fehr (2004) by subjecting relationships to stochastic interruptions. Using two different subject pools, we first replicate the basic pattern of high quality private contracting and low quality public contracting. We then study the impact of exogenous random ‘downturns’ in which firms ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2019
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3382951