RULES VERSUS DISCRETION IN FISCAL POLICY*
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Rules versus discretion in fiscal policy
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Manchester School
سال: 2011
ISSN: 1463-6786
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9957.2011.02240.x