Sales-Based Rebate Design

نویسندگان

چکیده

In this paper, we study a family of sales-based rebate mechanisms as an effective tool to implement price discrimination across population buyers with correlated heterogeneous valuations on indivisible goods and services. order such mechanisms, the seller charges each buyer fixed at time purchase contingent that is function ex post sales volume be realized end period. The declares both menu rebates sales. We show that, when there common component uncertainty in consumers’ (to which refer quality product), enable effectively induce different expected net prices valuations. Importantly, over achieved keeping base uniform all buyers. This uniformity key advantage our proposed mechanism, thereby providing new mechanism for crowd-based markets. use tools techniques from game theory variational optimization provide insight into economics mechanisms. particular, identify two are monotone functions easy practice perform well compared much more complex optimal mechanism. rigorous analysis discuss practical limitations implementing globally design, further demonstrating efficacy paper was accepted by Gabriel Weintraub, revenue management market analytics. Funding: research supported Vannevar Bush Fellowship Office Secretary State Army Research [MURI Project W911NF-19-1-0217]. Supplemental Material: data files available https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4691 .

برای دانلود رایگان متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Sales Rebate Contracts in Fashion Supply Chains

We explore in this paper the performance of sales rebate contracts in fashion supply chains. We conduct both analytical and numerical analyses via a mean-variance framework with reference to real empirical data. To be specific, we evaluate the expected profits and variance of profits risk of the fashion supply chains, fashion retailers, and manufacturers under 1 the currently implemented sales ...

متن کامل

Competing Suppliers under Sales-Rebate Contract and Price Sensitive Demand in a Decentralized Supply Chain

This paper studies a competition in a decentralized supply chain between two independent suppliers who sell their products to a common retailer, under sales-rebate contract, and wherein the demand is sensitive to retail prices. The inventory related operational costs are included in the chain based on the economic order quantity model. The conditions of existence and uniqueness of the retailer’...

متن کامل

Money Talks: Rebate Mechanisms in Reputation System Design

Reputation systems that rely on voluntary feedback from traders are important in creating and sustaining trust in markets. Reporting feedback, however, is often costly for the reporter and feedback is a public good. We combine theory with a laboratory experiment to study the effect of a novel seller precommitment mechanism on promoting feedback and market efficiency. Specifically, our precommit...

متن کامل

Sales Configurator Information Systems Design Theory

We look for means to advance the field of configuration systems via research that is performed rigorously and methodologically with the aim of theory creation. Specifically, we explore the use of Information Systems Design Theory (ISDT) as a framework for defining a design science theory for sales configurator construction. ISDT is the primary output of Design Science research that “shows the p...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Management Science

سال: 2023

ISSN: ['0025-1909', '1526-5501']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4691