منابع مشابه
Crime and Social Sanction
Social sanctions may be a strong deterrent of crime. This paper presents a formal model that relates crime and social sanction to social interaction density. We empirically test the theoretical predictions using a provincial level panel dataset on different crimes in Italy between 1996 and 2003. We exploit detailed demographic and geo-morphological information to develop exogenous measures of s...
متن کاملRunning head: CONTEXTS OF ANGER AND SHAME IN THE US AND JAPAN 1 Condoned or Condemned: The Situational Affordance of Anger and Shame in the US and Japan
Two studies tested the idea that the situations that people encounter frequently and the situations that they associate most strongly with an emotion differ across cultures in ways that can be understood from what a culture condones or condemns. In a questionnaire study, N=163 students from the US and Japan perceived situations as more frequent to the extent that they elicited condoned emotions...
متن کاملNeural Responses to Sanction Threats
Sanctions are used ubiquitously to enforce obedience to social norms. Recent field studies and laboratory experiments have demonstrated, however, that cooperation is sometimes reduced when incentives meant to promote pro-social decisions are added to the environment. Although a variety of explanations have been suggested, the neural foundations of this effect have not been fully explored. Using...
متن کاملOptimal Monitoring and Sanction Systems
Many countries rely on monitoring of jobseekers and benefit sanctions in case of noncompliance with job search requirements to encourage job search and to prevent abuse of the social insurance system. However, so far only little is known about the optimal design of monitoring and sanction systems. In a model with worker heterogeneity and endogenous policy choice for each period in the unemploym...
متن کاملPreschoolers value those who sanction non-cooperators.
Large-scale human cooperation among unrelated individuals requires the enforcement of social norms. However, such enforcement poses a problem because non-enforcers can free ride on others' costly and risky enforcement. One solution is that enforcers receive benefits relative to non-enforcers. Here we show that this solution becomes functional during the preschool years: 5-year-old (but not 4-ye...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Nature
سال: 1988
ISSN: 0028-0836,1476-4687
DOI: 10.1038/332576a0