Second-price common-value auctions under multidimensional uncertainty
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Second-price common-value auctions under multidimensional uncertainty
The literature has demonstrated that second-price common-value auctions are sensitive to the presence of asymmetries among bidders. In a two-bidder model, Bikhchandani [1988. Reputation in repeated second-price auctions. J. Econ. Theory 46, 97–119] has shown that if it is common knowledge that one bidder has a disadvantage compared to her opponent, that bidder (almost surely) never wins the auc...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2006
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2005.02.008