Second‐Best Tax Policies to Reduce Nonpoint Source Pollution
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Nonpoint Source Pollution Taxes and Excessive Tax Burden ∗
If a regulator is unable to measure firms’ individual emissions, an ambient tax can be used to achieve the socially desired level of pollution. With this tax, each firm pays a unit tax on aggregate emissions. In order for the tax to be effective, firms must recognize that their decisions affect aggregate emissions. When firms behave strategically with respect to the tax-setting regulator, under...
متن کاملReducing Nonpoint Source Pollution
76 Vegetated buff ers are a well-studied and widely used agricultural management practice for reducing nonpointsource pollution. A wealth of literature provides experimental data on their mitigation effi cacy. Th is paper aggregated many of these results and performed a meta-analysis to quantify the relationships between pollutant removal effi cacy and buff er width, buff er slope, soil type, a...
متن کاملNonpoint Source Pollution
A Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) program has been initiated in the North Bosque River Watershed in Texas, USA, where point and nonpoint sources of pollution are of a concern. The Soil and Water Assessment Tool (SWAT), which had been validated for flow and sediment and nutrient transport, was applied to quantify the effects of Best Management Practices (BMPs) related to dairy manure management ...
متن کاملMultiple Agents, and Agricultural Nonpoint-Source Water Pollution Control Policies
Assuming asymmetric information over farmer profits and zero transaction costs, prior literature has suggested that when regulating nonpoint source water pollution, a tax on management practices (inputs) can implement full-information allocations and is superior to a tax on estimated runoff. Using mechanism design theory under asymmetric information, this paper shows that under the same assumpt...
متن کاملNonpoint Source Pollution and Optimal Regulation
This paper analyzes effects of nonpoint source pollution on regulation optimal contracts in asymmetric information situation. We consider a continuum of agents (to formalize major characteristic of nonpoint source pollution) which pollute another agent (affected agent). We distinguish different forms of externalities and examine if it is always necessary to modify optimal contract of each respo...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Journal of Agricultural Economics
سال: 1996
ISSN: 0002-9092,1467-8276
DOI: 10.2307/1243867