Seigniorage, inflation, and reputation
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Seigniorage-maximizing inflation
What is the seigniorage-maximizing level of inflation? Four models formulae for the seigniorage maximizing inflation rate (SMIR) are compared. Two sticky-price models arrive at very different quantitative recommendations although both predict somewhat lower SMIRs than Cagan’s formula and a variant of a .ex-price model due to Kimbrough (2006). The models differ markedly in how inflation distorts...
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A solution to marketplace information asymmetries is to have trading partners publicly rate each other post-transaction. Many have shown these ratings are effective; we show that their effectiveness deteriorates over time. The problem is that ratings are prone to inflation, with raters feeling pressure to leave “above average” ratings, which in turn pushes the average higher. This pressure stem...
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Central banks like the Bank of England or the Bundesbank have highlighted recently that the supply of currency is achieved not by means of printing and spending but by means of credit. This clarification raises further issues. This article addresses the issue of seigniorage and optimal inflation. So far approaches to seigniorage and optimal inflation are still based on the assumption of a curre...
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When grades lose their informative value because the percentage of students receiving the best grade rises without any corresponding increase in ability, this is called grade inflation. Conventional wisdom says that such grade inflation is unavoidable since it is essentially costless to award good grades. In this paper, we point out an effect driving into the opposite direction: Grade inflation...
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Average public feedback scores given to sellers have increased strongly over time in an online marketplace. Changes in marketplace composition or improved seller performance cannot fully explain this trend. We propose that two factors inflated reputations: (1) it costs more to give bad feedback than good feedback when feedback is public because buyers fear retaliation and (2) this cost is incre...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Monetary Economics
سال: 1986
ISSN: 0304-3932
DOI: 10.1016/0304-3932(86)90052-8