Selective Trials: A Principal-Agent Approach to Randomized Controlled Experiments
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Economic Review
سال: 2012
ISSN: 0002-8282
DOI: 10.1257/aer.102.4.1279