Self-control and loss aversion in intertemporal choice
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Reference Points and Loss Aversion in Intertemporal Choice (Preliminary)
Reference points and loss aversion are two essential and commonly used concepts in behavioral economics. In this paper, based on insight of Loewenstein’s (1988) reference point model, we construct a structural model for intertemporal choice with reference points and loss aversion by considering four scenarios: delay of gains, delay of losses, speed-up of gains, and speed-up of losses. We use pa...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Journal of Socio-Economics
سال: 1997
ISSN: 1053-5357
DOI: 10.1016/s1053-5357(97)90012-3