منابع مشابه
Self-selective social choice functions
It is not uncommon that a society facing a choice problem has also to choose the choice rule itself. In such situations, when information about voters' preferences is complete, the voters' preferences on alternatives induce voters' preferences over the set of available voting rules. Such a setting immediately gives rise to a natural question concerning consistency between these two levels of ch...
متن کاملStrategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules
We provide exact relations giving the probability of individual and coalitional manipulation of three specific social choice functions (Borda rule, Copeland rule, Plurality rule) in three-alternative elections when the notion of self-selectivity is imposed. The results suggest that the Borda rule is more vulnerable to coalitional manipulation than the Copeland rule and the Plurality rule. Howev...
متن کاملReasoning About Social Choice Functions
We introduce a logic specifically designed to support reasoning about social choice functions. The logic includes operators to capture strategic ability, and operators to capture agent preferences. We establish a correspondence between formulae in the logic and properties of social choice functions, and show that the logic is expressively complete with respect to social choice functions, i.e., ...
متن کاملMinimally manipulable anonymous social choice functions
Gibbard [Gibbard, A., 1973. Manipulation of voting schemes: a general result. Econometrica 41, 587– 602] and Satterthwaite [Satterthwaite, M., 1975. Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions. Journal of Economic Theory 10,187–217] show that an anonymous social choice function with more than two alternative...
متن کاملGroup-Strategyproof Irresolute Social Choice Functions
We axiomatically characterize the class of pairwise irresolute social choice functions that are group-strategyproof according to Kelly’s preference extension. The class is narrow but contains a number of appealing Condorcet extensions such as the minimal covering set and the bipartisan set, thereby answering a question raised independently by Barberà (1977a) and Kelly (1977). These functions fu...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Social Choice and Welfare
سال: 2007
ISSN: 0176-1714,1432-217X
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-007-0276-6