Selling by clicks or leasing by bricks? A dynamic game for pricing durable products in a dual-channel supply chain

نویسندگان

چکیده

<p style='text-indent:20px;'>In this paper, we discuss if and which pricing policies by a manufacturer who sells its products online motivate retailer as an independent part to enter the market provide selling leasing options through brick store. Moreover, impact of shopping preferences brand image on end-user behavior is examined, different consumption patterns are considered. For purpose, dynamic game applied model supply chain consisting one retailer. The aims specify optimal in second-hand according physical utility associated with depreciation, image, for end-users infinite time horizon. Markov perfect equilibria considered solution concept predict long term. results revealed that enriching always benefits retailer, while it does not mean there same level both Besides, improvement makes more demand motivates be active market. Notably, play prominent role segmentation decision result. Also, growing production costs have significant reverse effect profitability Therefore, must focus economic production.</p>

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Industrial and Management Optimization

سال: 2023

ISSN: ['1547-5816', '1553-166X']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.3934/jimo.2021221