Selling Schelling Short: Reputations and American Coercive Diplomacy after Syria

Reputations and Signaling in Coercive Bargaining

When do states defend their reputations? States sometimes pay high costs to protect their reputations, but other times willingly tarnish them. What accounts for the difference? This article investigates reputation building in the context of coercive diplomacy. In coercive bargaining, giving in to a challenge can harm one’s reputation. I argue, however, that states value their reputations less—a...

Appendices for “Reputations and Signaling in Coercive Bargaining”

Comparative Study of Chinese and American Music Diplomacy after 9/11

Recently the role of music in international policy has been increased. In this article the role of norms and ideas is indispensable, Hence we have employed Constructivism as the conceptual framework, thereafter we would be investigating on Music Diplomacy of the US and China comparatively pursuant to Silk Road Strategies after 9/11. The main question of this Article is how the USA and China hav...

Deterrence and Coercive Diplomacy: The Contributions of Alexander George

Alexander George was a towering figure who made path breaking and enduring contributions to political psychology, international relations, and social science methodology. I focus on George’s closely related research programs on deterrence and coercive diplomacy, with special attention to the importance of the asymmetry of motivation, strategies for “designing around” a deterrent threat, the con...

Short-Selling Attacks and Creditor Runs

This paper investigates the mechanism through which short selling of a bank’s stocks can trigger the failure of the bank. In the model, creditors, who learn information from stock prices, will grow increasingly unsure about the bank’s true fundamentals in facing noisier stock prices; thus a run on the bank is more likely because of creditors’ concave payo¤. Understanding this, speculators condu...